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SLOT TRADING IN THE REFORM OF THE COUNCIL
REGULATION (EEC) NO. 95/93: A COMPARATIVE




2. The United States of America




The Council Regulation (EEC), dated January 18, 1993, n. 95/93
stating common rules regarding slot allocation in European
Community airports, is closely linked to the liberalization of Eu-
ropean Community air transport.1
AS IT CLEARLY seems from the "whereas" that introduceARegulation 95/93, it indeed appears that the "growing im-balance between the expansion of the air transport system in
* Graduated with first class honors in Law at the University of Turin (Italy).
Lawyer, Human Resources and General Affairs Manager of SAGAT (Managing
Body of Turin Airport). Contract Professor in Transportation Law at the
University of Turin.
1 To go into the disciplinary norms introduced in the so called third package
more carefully, see P. Girardi, La terzafase della liberalizzazione del trasporto aereo in
Europa: contenuti e problemi applicativi, DIR. DEI TRAsp. 39 (1993); G. Rinaldi Bac-
celli, La terza fase di liberalizzazione del trasporto aereo nella Comunitd Economica
Europea, DIR. PRAT. AviAz. CIv. 2,237 (1991); G. Silingardi, L'incidenza sul codice
della navigazione della normativa comunitaria del trasporto aereo, DIR. DE TRAsp. 343
(1997). To go into Regulation No. 95/93, please refer to P. Girardi & C. Colletta,
La nuova e attuale disciplina dell'assegnazione di bande oraie negli aeroporti comunitari.
Normativa e sviluppi dell'applicazione del regolamento (CEE) n. 95/93 del Consiglio del
18 gennaio 1993, in 43 TRAsp. 64 (1994); P.G. Bellan, L'assegnazione degli slot aero-
portuali: problematiche giuridiche, L'Attivita di transporto aereo dopo la liberalizzazione
del cabotaggio, MILANo (1998); G. Silingardi & D. Maffeo, Gli slots. Il caso Italia tra
esperienza statunitense e comunitaria, TURIN (1997).
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Europe and the availability of adequate airport infrastructure to
meet that demand (and consequently) ... the increasing num-
ber of congested airports in the Community," is the nerve centre
of the issue whilst being the most exposed within the liberaliza-
tion process. As a matter of fact, the facilitation of the competi-
tion and encouragement to enter into the market . . . "require
strong support for carriers who intend to start operations on in-
tra-Community routes," aid that is realized through a technique
of "allocation of slots at congested airports.., based on neutral,
transparent and non-discriminatory rules." Consequently a sys-
tem for slot allocation is needed in order to "avoid situations
where, owing to a lack of available slots, the benefit of liberaliza-
tion is unevenly spread, and competition is distorted."2 The
Regulation 95/93 did not achieve the desired results.
The Members of the European Community were slow in ap-
plying the rules that were set down. Some points were not fully
understood and consequently there have been several different
interpretations. Thus, carriers have been treated differently in
the various congested airports within the Community, even in
the complex task of allocating slots.
Furthermore, not all of the co-ordinators acted indepen-
dently; the rule concerning the withdrawal of slots was not ap-
plied correctly in every circumstance. There was a lack in
transparency, and the rights of new carriers were not thoroughly
guaranteed.
The growing difficulty in obtaining "good" slots in order to
improve service made it increasingly difficult to get in and has
therefore reduced competition while favouring the dominant
carriers that are able to benefit from their "grandfather rights"
for an unlimited period of time in the future. This distortion of
the market has restricted the fulfilment of the positive effect of
the liberalization. 3
The European Commission, therefore, decided to ask the
Coopers & Lybrand company to analyze how the Regulation 95/
93 was applied and to propose changes. The Coopers &
Lybrand report was published on October 17, 1995,4 and it led
2 The first, eighth, second, twelfth whereas, respectively.
3 See Silingardi & Maffeo, supra note 1, at 92.
4 See Coopers & Lybrand Final Report, The application and possible modification of
Council Regulation 95/93 on Common Rules for the allocation of Slots at Community
Airports, Oct. 17, 1995 (1995 Final Report to the European Commission). See also
Silingardi & Maffeo, supra note 1, at 96.
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to a number of meetings between experts from the European
Community member states and representatives of the sector.
However, in the last five years, the Commission has not yet
reached a written proposal to improve the situation. This is
probably due to the wide variety of opinions, particularly on the
subject of the so-called "grandfather rights" and the trading of
slots.
In the meantime, congestion in European skies has worsened
dramatically. 5 Moreover, the growth in air traffic has by no
means corresponded with the increase in airport capacity6 and
has generated a "hidden" market in the trading of slots. Be-
cause we are talking about a "hidden" market, it is difficult to
estimate its exact size and economic value. Slots have indeed a
high economic value in spite of the fact that they are not bought
at first. Only once they have been allocated, according to the
priority of the right gained, do they immediately gain value due
to the fact that other carriers, who do not have enough slots or
have slots at non-peek times, want to acquire them (the trade in
such circumstances can be defined as "secondary trading").
The investigation carried out by Coopers & Lybrand revealed
numerous sales of slots.
Other cases showed that major carriers bought smaller com-
panies out in order to acquire their slots. For example, in 1997
British Airways took over British Caledonian to have its slots at
London Gatwick.
Another interesting aspect of this trade is the case of renting a
branch of a company set down and agreed upon in 1996 be-
tween the carriers Noman and Air One. This allowed the latter
to use fourteen slots of the former at Linate Airport.7
In May 2000, a couple of slots at Gatwick Airport belonging to
AB Airlines were sold to Virgin Atlantic, seemingly for the sum
5 A recent study evaluates the economic consequences of air traffic congestion
in Europe as resulting in 1.4 billion American dollars in 1994 and possibly reach-
ing 6 billion American dollars in the year 2000. The traffic lost due to traffic
congestion is estimated at about 27 million passengers in the year 2000. British
Airways estimated that congestion linked to the ATC problem causes them to
consume 50,000 tons of extra fuel each year.
6 According to the AEA, over 90% of European Airports used by more than
five million passengers a year will meet serious problems on the runway and the
apron before the year 2005, while sixteen major airports will experience satura-
tion problems from the year 2001 onward.
7 See Silingardi & Maffeo, supra note 1, at 35, 89.
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of two million British Pounds. A recent estimated value of slots
at London Heathrow Airport is over one billion British Pounds!'
To put an end to this "hidden" market and guarantee more
transparency on the matter regarding the allocation of slots, the
European Commissioner of Transport, Loyola de Palacio, has
decided to propose a thorough revision of the Regulation 95/93
so as to include a norm that allows for the sale of slots.9
Before looking closer at this proposed revision, it is appropri-
ate to look at what has happened in the United States, where a
norm on the trading of slots has been in force since 1985.10
This look allows us to have an interesting comparison and to see
whether the legalization of slots trading favours the establish-
ment of a truly competitive market eliminating the dominant
position of certain major carriers that have advantages over new
entrants in the market, and at the same time, guarantees that
consumer-users are able to take advantage of better flight offers
and more competitive prices."
2. The United States of America
2.1. The high-density rule.
In 1968, several American airports, with their relative air
space, were close to saturation. The most congested areas being
Chicago, New York, and Washington. In particular, flights for
New York were normally delayed and occasionally cancelled,
due to intense traffic. In the summer of 1968, delays increased
by 30% compared to the previous year. The situation had be-
come unacceptable for all concerned: the carriers, the passen-
gers, and the Federal Government. 12 Consequently, the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), proposed a specific norm to be
applied at airports designated as high-density risk areas. The at-
tention of FAA was focused on several airports: John F. Kennedy
(JFK), La Guardia (LGA), Newark (EWA), Chicago O'Hare
8 See John Balfour, Who really owns the slots? A legal view, Presentation at the
London Strategy For Overcoming Slots Limitation Congress (June 27, 2000).
9 No. 7765 BULLETIN QUOTIDIEN EUROPE, July 26, 2000, at 6.
10 The chapter on the United States of America is an integration and updating
of the chapter 3.1 quoted volume. See Silingardi & Maffeo, supra note 1 at 47.
11 See C. Pozzi, Il ritiro dello slot e della serie di slot nel reg. (CEE) n. 95/93, DIR. DEI
TRAsP. 485 (1999).
12 Report to Congress: A Study of the High Density Rule: Technical Supplement No. 2
and Trend Analysis, U.S. Department of Transportation, May 1995, at 22 (herein-
after Study of the High Density Rule).
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(ORD), and Washington National (DCA).13 The FAA indicated,
however, that if congestion and delay increased in other areas, it
would consider an extension to those areas of these air traffic
rules. These rules proposed to limit the number of Instrument
Flight Rule (IFR)14 operations (takeoff and landings) permitted
per hour and to require that a "slot" support each operation.
The FAA proposed to allocate the hourly IFR reservation or
"slots" among three classes of users: air carriers, commuters, and
all other aircraft operators. 15 In December 1968, the FAA
adopted the high-density rule. 16 In the preamble to the rule,
the FAA specified that the rule should not be considered as the
permanent solution to the air congestion issue, and that in time,
it would be reviewed and modified as circumstances suggested.
In February 1969, the FAA amended the rule, stating its tem-
porariness and establishing that it would expire on December
31, 1969.17 The FAA was forced to extend the expiration date,
even before it arrived, as conditions had remained unaltered.
In 1973, the FAA stated that it would uphold the high-density
norms for an indefinite period of time at O'Hare, J.F. Kennedy,
La Guardia, and Washington National airports.
Although the high-density rule stated how to determine the
maximum number of IFR operations at each concerned airport
and how to allocate the number of slots among the different
types of operators, it did not contain a provision allocating the
slots among the operators within each class.'
13 When the high-density rule was proposed, the DCA had been subject to op-
erating restrictions for the last two years. In fact, in 1966, carriers that used DCA
airport had reached an agreement, following an FAA request, to limit their oper-
ations (takeoff and landings) voluntarily to no more than forty per hour.
'4 The Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) require IFR operations when
weather conditions are below the minimum for flights under visual flight rules
(VFR). In establishing the number of IFR movements, the FAA stated that it
would take into consideration ground facilities, weather conditions, noise abate-
ment procedures, aircraft mix, the uniformity of flow, runway combinations and
the availability of alternative airports, in each case.
15 For purposes of this article, "air carriers" mean carriers that use jets with
over fifty-six seats and turbojets with over seventy-five seats; "commuters" mean
carriers that use jets with less than fifty-six seats and turbojets with less than sev-
enty-five seats; "other" means general aviation and charters.
16 An FAA final rule designatedJFK, LGA, EWR, ORD and DCA as high-density
airports. The rule was to become effective on April 27, 1969. See High Density
Rule, 33 Fed. Reg. 17,896 (1968) (codified on Apr. 27, 1969 at 14 C.F.R. pt. 93).
17 See Eileen M. Gleimer, Slot Regulation at High Density Airports: How Did We Get
Here and Where Are We Going?, 61 J. AIR L. & CoM. 877 (1996).
18 See id. at 880.
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In fact, the FAA expressly contemplated that the airlines
would voluntarily reach decisions to reduce their schedules to
the level required by the high-density rule and noted that the
airlines were already discussing schedule changes pursuant to
authority granted by the Federal Government. 9
In fact, the carriers arrived at agreements through Scheduling
Committees, which were approved by the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB), and these agreements allowed them immunity
from the antitrust laws.2°
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 caused this system to fail
when new carriers attempting to break into the market lowered
prices considerably and offered new flight connections.
At first, the influx of these new carriers did not cause great
problems at airports subject to high-density rules, as the number
of slots requested was not so high as to affect the agreements
that had already been reached and established by the Schedul-
ing Committees. However, in the winter of 1980, the system
came to a halt for the first time when the New York Air Com-
pany announced that it wanted to start a shuttle service between
Washington and New York. In order to do this, New York Air
asked for slots at both Washington National and La Guardia
airports.
The dead end came to a head within the Washington Na-
tional Airport Scheduling Committee, when New York Air asked
for twenty slots to be spread out at all peak hour times and was
faced with opposition from the other carriers that had no inten-
tion of giving up their flight schedules.
Having understood that a voluntary system for the carriers to
reach any agreement was now impossible, the FAA decided to
intervene by allowing New York Air to operate on eighteen of
the twenty slots originally requested. Some of these slots were
taken from carriers that readily gave them up while the others
were taken away from twelve of the most important carriers and
members of the Scheduling Committee.
The legitimacy of the FAA action was contested by some of
the carriers, but the appeals court21 confirmed the action by stat-
ing that the intervention taken was thoroughly legitimate, apt in
19 In 1968, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) allowed carriers operating at
Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, and Washington airports to voluntarily arrive at
decisions to change their schedules.
20 See 14 C.F.R. pt. 93 (K), (S).
21 See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Goldschmidt, 645 F.2d 1309, 1318 (8th Cir.
1981).
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its procedure, and with a rational basis. The court went on to
say that the action taken was fully coherent with the competition
policy set down in the Airline Deregulation Act. The combined
effect of the liberalization process and the strong intervention
of the FAA put the former agreement between carriers that had
been valid until that moment, into question.
The FAA therefore decided to adopt a new system for allocat-
ing slots based partly on its own direct intervention; partly on an
auctioning system and partly on decisions taken by the Schedul-
ing Committees. However, this proposal failed to be applied
due to industrial action taken by the air traffic controllers in
1981.
In order to face the air traffic paralysis caused by this strike,
the FAA substituted the high-density rules with the National Air
Traffic Control Contingency Plan. This later became known as
the Interim Operation Plan, and through this, it was possible to
enforce restrictions at twenty-two of the busiest airports, thus re-
ducing the carriers' scheduled operations by twenty percent.
Furthermore, the FAA introduced a Slot Exchange Agree-
ment, which allowed slots to be bought, sold, and exchanged
between carriers for an experimental period of forty-two days.
All transactions had to be approved by the FAA. During this
period, 248 slots were traded with a market price that varied
from $12,000 to $500,000 per slot.22 For the government and
the carriers, the possibility to trade slots was a new experience.
And for the first time, an economic value was applied to the
slots. In order to optimize the use of air space, the FAA intro-
duced a rule known as "Use-or-Lose" that stated that all slots
acquired must be used for a minimum of seventy percent of the
time, otherwise they would be confiscated. Finally, the FAA in-
troduced a kind of sweepstake system to attribute slots to new
carriers.
In August 1984, the restrictions set down by the Interim Oper-
ation Plan were abolished and the high-density rules were again
applied. In spite of all this, there was still highly congested air
space and outstanding delays during peak hours at major air-
ports. It became more and more obvious that the system of
reaching agreement on a voluntary basis was not suitable in a
deregulation context.
The practical obstacles faced by the Scheduling Committees
(for example those concerning unanimity), together with the
22 See Study of the High Density Rule, supra note 12, at 26.
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basic concept of deregulation-that the market itself can guar-
antee an environment for a better and more competitive organi-
zation in assigning slots-led the FAA, the industry, and
Congress to consider the introduction of rules on the trading of
slots to be added to the high-density rule.
2.2 Rules on slot trading
The FAA adopted The Buy-Sell Rule in December 1985,
which allows air carriers and commuters to sell slots in four
high-density airports.
The first slot allocation was based on the so-called "grandfa-
ther clause," as air carriers and commuters were considered to
be the recognized holders of slots that they had already ac-
quired up until December 16, 1985.23 The smaller carriers with
fewer slots contested this rule of slot allocation, pointing out
that the larger companies had arbitrary economic and practical
advantages over them. The transportation department re-
sponded to this criticism by stating that such initial benefits were
necessary in order to establish a buy-sell system and at the same
time, minimize any difficulties that could affect service. In addi-
tion, the transportation department claimed that the "grandfa-
ther clause" was in effect a recognition of the investment and
commitment that these carriers had made in the past concern-
ing personnel, equipment, communication networks, and
planning.
The most important provisions set down in the trading rule
are the following:
Slots are allocated according to three types of users: carriers,
commuters and others;
The FAA has the right to create, eliminate or withdraw slots
for any reason unless they are allocated to essential services
(EAS) 24 or international services. In the case of the EAS slots,
23 See id. at 65.
24 In the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), a measure was introduced, even
though it had transitory effect, that changed one of the main principles of free-
dom of air traffic movement for the worse (i.e., the possibility for carriers to
reduce, suspend or interrupt a flight service definitively according to the com-
pany's economical status). This measure was done to favor and guarantee "essen-
tial" air links with "smaller American communities." The general fear that free
access to the transport market would cause carriers to forsake air links considered
to be less profitable, forced the American lawmakers to adopt measures that
favoured "local services." This is the case in Art. 419 of the ADA, that guarantees
the classification "essential" for services that cover links to and from "small com-
munities" that are considered to be "eligible" with aid of a federal grant, for a
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they can only be withdrawn by the Transport Secretary, if
deemed necessary, whereas in the case of international slots they
can only be withdrawn if they are not used for a period of more
than two weeks;
Slots can also be bought by non-carriers;2 5
All permanent slots, 26 except for those covering international
services or EAS, can be bought, sold, exchanged or leased out,
rented on a daily, weekly or monthly or undetermined period of
time basis, by anyone, with no limit in quantity, at any high den-
sity airport;
Slots have to be used for 80 percent of the time within two
months; otherwise the FAA can withdraw them; 27
Slots voluntarily returned by air carriers or commuters, slots
withdrawn by the FAA under the use or lose provision, and new
slots can be put on offer through a lottery.2 8
2.3 Nature of the slot market
The slot market has the following basic characteristics:
Slots are not goods in that the seller cannot produce them.
Slots have a value because they facilitate air travel to and from
high-density airports. They do not have an intrinsic value on
their own. 29 Furthermore, in contrast with industry where the
period of 10 years. See 49 U.S.C. § 1389 (2000). This article also restricts the
carriers in suspending or abandoning links with the "small communities" unless
they are temporary and in line with the provision of the essential services (EAS).
Id.; see G. Silingardi, Gli oneri di pubblico servizio nel trasporto aereo comunitario, DIR.
DEI TRAsp. 45 (2000); Il completamento delle misure di liberalizzazione del trasporto
aereo, Riv. GIUR. CIRC. 512 (1997).
25 This provision has special importance both in local communities that buy
slots to guarantee that the local airport is connected to at least one of the high-
density airports and to those carriers that intend to use the slots they have ac-
quired as guarantee for loans. For example, the Shawmut Bank holds slots be-
longing to TWA; the State Street & Trust Company holds slots belonging to
Business Express; and the City Bank holds slots belonging to USAir Shuttle.
26 For the FAA, a slot is not considered to be permanent if it is allocated for a
brief period of time and has to go back to its Scheduling Committee. High Den-
sity Traffic Airports; Slot Allocation and Transfer Methods, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,180,
52,183 (final rule proposed Dec. 20, 1985).
27 The aim of this provision is to stop companies from detaining clusters of
slots for speculative reasons and so favor an optimal use of airport capacity. Id.
In reality, as it will be noted later, this goal is systematically eluded as carriers rent
their slots out to other companies or use them, even at a loss, during weekends so
as to avoid going under the minimum level of use established.
28 The last lottery took place in 1989, and it seems that the FAA does not in-
tend to proceed with further extractions.
- See Study of the High Density Rule, supra note 12, at 68.
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sellers produce the goods, slots can only be created by a third
party, the Federal Government, that does not make up any part
of the market, neither as a buyer nor as a seller.
Slots are not subject to property rights. The FAA stated that
"[s] lots do not represent a property right but represent an oper-
ating privilege subject to absolute FAA control.""0 The court
held that slots are not property themselves and that even if a
limited proprietary interest arose from the allocation of slots,
transfer, or disposition of such slots would nevertheless require
FAA approval. 31 On the other hand, the bankruptcy courts que-
ried this principle. 32 In the case of the McClain Airlines bank-
ruptcy, the court stated that slots are property of the estate of
the debtor airline, which has been granted slots, despite the
Federal Aviation Act, which prohibited the CAB from creating
property rights in air transportation. Notwithstanding the FAA's
disclaimer of "property rights" in slots, the court held that such
a position must be -assessed according to current administrative
developments (that is, the buy-sell rule that permits carriers to
purchase or sell slots). The court also noted that the enactment
of rules to minimize "the need for government intervention..."
and the provision of "maximum reliance on market forces to
determine slot distribution . . ." was difficult to reconcile with
the FAA's claim that such free market items do not constitute
property rights.3 3 On other occasions, the Court had taken deci-
sions by referring to a former McClain case, stating that the posi-
tion of the FAA, which sustained that slots do not represent any
property right is invalid as they do detract from the reality that a
market for these slots exists and that carriers possess a proprie-
tary right in allocated slots even if that is burdened by condi-
tions imposed by FAA regulations. By applying this concept, the
court determined that any proprietary interest held by the air-
line in the slots terminated automatically when the airline failed
to use the slots for the requisite period of time and that the
withdrawal of the slots by the FAA did not violate the automatic
stay contained in the Bankruptcy Code.34 This judgment, put
forward by the Bankruptcy Court, forced the FAA to recognize
30 14 C.F.R. pt. 93.223(a) (2000). See also Prof. Haanappel, Airport Slots and
Market Access: Some Basic Notions and Solutions, AIR & SPACE LAW 202 (1993).
31 See In re Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 942 (5th
Cir. 1983).
32 Gleimer, supra note 17, at 891 n.62, 63.
33 In re McClain Airlines, Inc., 80 B.R. 175, 179 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1987).
34 See In re Gull Air, Inc., 890 F.2d 1255, 1259-60 (1st Cir. 1989).
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slots for what they are and in the light of the buy-sell rule they
are in fact rights of property that have to be defended in case of
bankruptcy.35
Not all slots can be bought and sold. Only national slots and
those classed as air carriers and commuter slots can be put on
the market.
Other slots have no market value. In contrast to slots that al-
low a certain party to land or takeoff at an airport in a certain
time and day of the week, those in the "other" category are slots
held by the FAA and allocated for use of the general aviation
bodies or other users during IFR conditions. These latter slots
cannot be detained, exchanged, bought, sold, or rented out.
2.4 The value of slots
The market value of slots is not homogeneous: slots that allow
aircraft of all sizes like those that permit aircraft to fly at peak
times are obviously worth more. United Airlines pointed out
that peak hour slots at O'Hare airport were sold for over two
million American dollars. Such a high price is not surprising
considering that every United Airlines slot at this airport gener-
ates a turnover to the value of five million American dollars per
year. An additional advantage is that acquisition of slots keeps
competitors at bay.
The market value of a slot is therefore determined according
to the airport, the time allocated, the season, the category of
operators able to use it (air carriers or commuters), and other
factors linked to availability of gates. Other elements that influ-
ence the price of a slot are operative limitation. For example,
Washington National is one of the busiest high-density airports
with severe noise abatement procedures and major operative
runway limitations, all of which make the slots at this airport
particularly high in value.
The cost of slots in airports that are subjected to the high-
density rule could prohibit new carriers from entering into com-
petition, although it should be noted that in reality, the major
air companies would avoid selling slots, whatever the price. 6
35 The FAA claimed that the principle of slots as property upheld by the Bank-
ruptcy Courts "[has] not been found in any other context." In re United Airlines,
Inc., No. 27151, B.R. (May 3, 1993).
36 See Airport Mobilization: Barriers to Entry & Impediments to Competition, Hearings
on the State of Competition in the Airline Industry Before the House Committee on the
Judiciary, Cong. 67-330 (2000), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/
demp0614.htm [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Paul Stephen Dempsey).
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In the following, we will show how some of the most signifi-
cant transactions occurred in recent years: In 1990, United Air-
lines paid 60 million American dollars for twenty-one slots and
the use of gates at O'Hare airport. In the same year, American
Airlines bought fourteen slots at La Guardia and Washington
National airport. On that occasion it was said that slots at such
busy airports were generally sold for a value that ranged be-
tween 500,000 and 1 million American dollars per slot, the price
being determined according to its time and its takeoff and land-
ing rights."
In 1991, USAir bought ten slots at Washington National and
twelve slots at La Guardia for 16.8 million American dollars
(that is $760,000 per slot). USAir also bought eight slots at La
Guardia airport for 6 million American dollars (that is $750,000
per slot). American Airlines bought twelve slots at La Guardia
airport and ten slots at Washington National for 21.4 million
American dollars (that is $970,000 per slot). Continental
bought thirty-five slots at La Guardia airport taking on a debt
worth 54 million American dollars from Eastern Airlines (that is
$1.5 million paid per slot). Delta bought six slots at La Guardia
airport for 3.5 million American dollars (that is $585,000 paid
per slot). 38 In 1996, it is said that a new entrant on the market
was forced to pay approximately 2 million American dollars for
a single slot at La Guardia airport.39
2.5 The trading of slots and competition. The Authorization
Act of 1994.
While opportunities to introduce rules dealing with the trad-
ing of slots were being discussed, the opposition of such new
legislative moves put forward the following objections:4 °
(1) It would give an undeserved "windfall" to incumbents;
(2) It would increase air fares;
(3) It could cause slots used for service to small communities to
be outbid by carriers seeking to serve more lucrative routes; and
(4) It would create anticompetitive incentives for large carriers
to outbid smaller carriers for slots.41
37 See id. at 11.
33 See id.
39 See id.
40 See id. at 9.
41 Hearings, supra note 36, at 9.
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The past shows that many of the objections presented had
sound bases. However, they contrasted with the position taken
by the Department of Transportation that maintained that the
larger airline companies would not use their resources and the
flexibility created by the buy-sell rules to control the market and
create dominant positions at high-density airports.
"Reality has shown that the Department of Transportation's
beliefs were quite naive."42
A study carried out by the Department of Transportation has
shown that sales between unrelated carriers have decreased
from 110 per quarter in 1986 to 28 per quarter in 1987 to 12 per
quarter in 1988.41
In order to work more effectively, the market needs to have a
certain number of sellers and buyers. The slot market, on the
other hand, has an excess of buyers and very few sellers. Those
who have slots tend to protect and keep their share of the mar-
ket in order to avoid favouring any potential competitors. It is
sufficient to note that the main American airline companies
have control of 91% of the slots at Washington National Airport,
and the rest are almost all controlled by commuter companies
that are also their affiliate companies."
The buy-sell rule caused an increase in the price of slots, as
forecast by those that opposed it in the first place. The General
Accounting Office (GAO) found that airports, where entry is
limited by slot control, have about seven percent higher
airfares.45 For example, the average prices at La Guardia airport
are thirty-five percent higher than those at thirty-three other air-
ports.4 6 In order to resolve this situation in 1993, the Baliles
Commission pointed out to the FAA the need to "review the rule
that limits operations at high density airports with the aim of
either removing these artificial limits ....
Consequently, with the 1994 Authorization Act, the FAA au-
thorized the Department of Transportation to allow slot exemp-
tions and to permit new entrants48 to provide services at high-
density airports (with the exception of the Washington airport).
42 See Gleimer, supra note 17, at 896 n.88.
43 See id.at 910, n.141.
44 See Hearings, supra note 36, at 10.
45 See id at 12.
46 Id.
47 See id. at 14 (citations omitted).
48 A 'new entrant' is a carrier or commuter that holds and operates (or held
and operated from December 16, 1985, onwards) less than twelve slots at the
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The Authorization Act states that the Department of Trans-
portation can allow slot exemptions whenever public interest is
involved and exceptional circumstances require it.49
Up until the late 1990s, the Department of Transportation
did not recognize the so-called "exceptional circumstances"
when an incumbent carrier is already running a non-stop service
on a route that is then requested by the new entrant.50
In fact, up until 1996, the Department of Transportation ac-
cepted very few requests for exemption and only whenever a
new entrant wanted to run a service on a route that was not
already covered did it allow non-stop links.51
The U.S. GAO seriously criticized this narrow interpretation
of the "exceptional circumstances" doctrine.
In its October 1996 report to Congress, (Airline Deregulation:
Barriers to Entry Continue in Several Key Domestic Markets),
the GAO found that "control of slots by a few airlines greatly
deters entry at key airports in Chicago, New York and
Washington."
The GAO also found
few new entries have occurred (at slot-constrained airports) be-
cause the DOT has interpreted the 'exceptional circumstances'
criterion narrowly and has rejected applications to provide ser-
vice in those markets already receiving non-stop service .... In
our review of the legislative history, however, we found no con-
gressional guidance on the interpretation of the "exceptional cir-
cumstance" criterion. Moreover, by selecting a very narrow
interpretation, DOT has discouraged entry, according to senior
management at many airlines that started after deregulation.
They told us that DOT's narrow interpretation of the exceptional
circumstance discouraged them from applying for slots. Many
airport in question, not including the international slots, EAS or certain night
slots at La Guardia and Washington airports. See 49 U.S.C. § 41714 (h)(3)
(1994).
49 See 49 U.S.C. § 41714 (c) (1).
50 See Hearings, supra note 36, at 15.
51 In September 1994, the Department of Transportation allowed an exemp-
tion to Reno Air permitting them to run three flights to end from Reno and
O'Hare airports - a link where no other non-stop service already existed. See In Re
Reno Air, Inc., D.O.T. Order 94-9-30 (Sept. 20, 1994). The exemption stipulated
the exact times when the carriers had to take off and land and that the service be
carried out only by stage 3 aircraft. Id. The order also made it clear that Reno
Air had only been granted a temporary authorization and did not own or hold
the slots. This limited their power to sell, trade, exchange or give up slots. De-
spite all this, Reno Air was also subject to the "use-or-lose" rule, which is usually
applied to holders and owners of slots at high-density airports.
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noted, for example that they would not "waste the time" applying
to DOT for slots in markets where an incumbent carrier already
provided non-stop service. They also suggested that competition
could be substantially increased in some markets if Congress re-
vised the exemption criteria so that applications resulting in sub-
stantial competitive benefits are allowed.52
In response to statements made by GAO, the Department of
Transportation announced that it would interpret the "excep-
tional circumstance" criterion "in a less restrictive way in order
to encourage competition." Henceforth, the DOT would find
"exceptional circumstances" to exist warranting an exemption
from the High-Density Rule based on the following: (1) appli-
cants would fly jet aircraft that meet Stage 3 noise requirements
in the market; (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the pro-
posed service would be operationally and financially viable; and
(3) the applicant either (a) will offer new non-stop service
where none now exists, or (b) has demonstrated potential to
offer low-fare competition, there is a single carrier service and
the market could support competition, or the existing carriers
do not provide meaningful competition.
The first decision showing this new interpretation of the rule
had been applied concerned a request by Frontier Airlines. The
Department of Transportation recognized the need to intro-
duce a new service and create competition with an incumbent
service and more specifically a low cost service. The DOT
judged that "substantial benefits can be achieved through in-
creasing competition at slot-constrained airports in situations
where consumer would be able to obtain significantly lower
fares in non-competitive or underserved markets."53
DOT also experimented with a program of allocating slot ex-
emptions to selected communities in order to assist them in se-
curing service to slot-constrained airports.
Major carriers alleged that the real reason for the new en-
trants' applications for exemptions is that they wanted to avoid
the expense of purchasing or leasing slots at a slot-constrained
airport and thereby, sought again a competitive advantage by
avoiding the normal cost of doing business.
An objection was made; pointing out that the large airline
companies had obtained slots at high-density airports without
paying any cost or without renting. Furthermore, as aforemen-
52 Hearings, supra note 36, at 15.
5 Id. at 18.
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tioned, it is common practice to rent out slots to other compa-
nies just to keep hold of them and in this way, block any new
entrants to the market.54
The 1994 Act also required DOT to conduct a study of the
High-Density Rule and report back to Congress. A year later,
the DOT carried out a study and completed a report.
The report revealed that the high-density rule had often cre-
ated artful timetable limits on operations and had consequently
reduced movement. On repeal of this rule, there would be an
increase in capacity, especially at Washington National and
O'Hare airports. As far as Kennedy airport is concerned, the
capacity of the runways matches the number of slots allocated,
whilst other flight infrastructures could allow for an increase in
traffic. At La Guardia airport, on the other hand, the number
of slots allocated exceeds the capacity of the runways.
The DOT therefore found that the banning of the rule, or
even a substantial modification of it, would bring an increase of
the number of movements: an increase that would cause both
benefits and cost reductions. For example, users could benefit
from new and extended airline services and low cost fares. Air-
ports would also benefit from a rise in income due to the in-
crease in movements. Vice versa, the incumbent carriers would
face loss in profits due to the increase in competition.
At the same time, there would be a high concentration of
flights at peak-hours, which would cause sound pollution and
delays.
By analyzing costs and benefits, that is, subtracting the addi-
tional costs caused by delays from the increase in income and
taking into account the new passengers using the airport follow-
ing the elimination of the High-Density Rule, the Department of
Transportation worked out that O'Hare airport could earn a net
profit to the value of $205 million per year and Kennedy airport
could earn $57 million per year.
La Guardia and Washington airports, on the other hand,
would have losses on the banning of the High-Density Rule, ac-
cording to the Department of Transportation calculations. 55
54 Id. at 19 (showing how paradoxical the large companies are by strongly pro-
testing against the exemptions permitted on the domestic market, while being
the first in line to request exemptions at foreign airports such as London
Heathrow and Tokyo Narita).
55 Gleimer, supra note 17, at 924.
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The Department of Transportation, therefore, found that the
revocation of the High-Density Rule would directly affect the in-
trinsic value of the slots because their prices are established by
the access limits set at high-density airports.
The reduction in value would cause downfall in the selling
market. This reduction in value of the slots would consequently
put a stop to the practice of using slots as guarantees; depriving
the airline companies of an important financial resource and
also creating substantial problems to banks that had accepted
slots as a form of guarantee.
2.6 The "Perimeter Rules"
At Washington National and La Guardia airports, the "perim-
eter rules" have been applied, bringing with them strong anti-
competition effects.
In the 1960s, the Civil Aeronautics Board originally fixed the
distance limit between the airport of origin or destination and
Washington National airport at 600 miles. The Department of
Transportation later extended this limit to a 1,000-mile radius in
1981 and further extended it to 1,250 miles, with the approval of
the Congress of the Washington Metropolitan Airport Act, in
1986.
This restriction was criticized in a study on American Aero-
nautic Industry Competition, carried out by the Transportation
Research Board, in 1999:
These rules no longer serve their original purpose and have pro-
duced so many adverse side effects, including barriers to compe-
tition. These rules arbitrarily prevent some airlines from
extending their networks to these airports; they discourage com-
petition among the airports in the region and among the airlines
that use these airports; they are subject to chronic attempts by
special interest groups to obtain exemptions. 56
2.7. Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for
the 2 1 t Century
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 aimed to eliminate all
restrictions for entering the air transport market. However, as
we have already seen, the slot rules and, to a certain extent, the
perimeter rules, continue to represent strong barriers against
true competitiveness.
5 Hearings, supra note 36, at 25.
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Not even the widest interpretation of the clause "exceptional
circumstances" given by the Department of Transportation has
been able to change the situation substantially.
It is sufficient to note that out of 3,100 slots for domestic air
carriers at four high-density airports, only forty-five are held by
airline companies that begun to operate after deregulation.57
This anticompetitive situation 58 certainly does not provide the
consumer with any advantages.59
Despite all this, many sectors continue to oppose the abolition
of this rule. Environmentalists fear the elimination of slot re-
strictions will blast residents with noise. Small communities fear
slot elimination will cause them to lose access to congested air-
ports. Incumbent airlines, which have spent millions of dollars
hoarding slots, and lending institutions, which have used slots as
collateral for airline loans, object to their removal on economic
grounds.6 °
In February 1999, the Department of Transportation ignored
these objections and proposed the repeal of most of the rule
concerning slot allocation to encourage the entry of new compa-
nies and increase competition.
On April 25, 2000, the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment
Reform Act for the 21st Century (FAIR 21)61 was promulgated.
57 Intervention at the Senate of Sen. John McCain, Oct. 29, 1997.
58 In the case regarding the alliance between American Airlines and British
Airways, before the Department of Transportation, the representative of the De-
partment ofJustice noted: "Moreover, where service in a market is constrained by
slot availability, a hub carrier with access to a large pool of slots has even greater
ability to respond to entry in [an anticompetitive] way because the entrant will be
unable to add capacity on its own." Hearings, supra note 36, at 3.
59 A study of the fares shows negative consequences of such monopolistic situa-
tions. This point can be illustrated by looking at the prices on certain routes. For
example, from Atlanta to Dulles where there is competition between Delta Air-
lines and Air Tran, a return ticket costs $188.50 whereas a return ticket between
Atlanta and Washington National, where Air Tran cannot operate and only Delta
can fly, costs $1,008. Id. at 27.
6 Id. at 4.
61 The Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Cen-
tury (FAIR 21) constitutes a strong reform of American Civil Aviation. Pub. L.
No. 106-181, 114 Stat 61 (2000). The aim of this law is to strengthen the whole
aviation system and make the airport and the skies safer, while at the same time
using airport taxes paid by passengers and operators in a better way and increas-
ing competition between carriers. Id. Air traffic in the USA has increased in the
last five years by 27 percent, reaching 655 million passengers in 1995. It is fore-
casted that this figure will increase to one billion passengers in the year 2010.
With this positive data in mind, it cannot be ignored that airports are becoming
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FAIR 21 introduces a gradual elimination of all restrictions
linked to slots at La Guardia, Kennedy, and O'Hare airports.
Such restrictions should be totally eliminated at O'Hare airport
before July 1, 2002, while the deadline at the two New York air-
ports is before January 1, 2007.62
The carriers that run a limited number of flights can, mean-
while, increase their operations by taking advantage of twenty
slots each at New York airports and thirty slots each at Chicago
O'Hare airport.
The Department of Transportation is authorized to allow slot
exemptions for those carriers that intend to run a non-stop ser-
vice using aircraft that have less than seventy-one seats on flight
paths between La Guardia, Kennedy, and O'Hare and minor
airports.63
more and more congested, single carriers dominate the internal market, delays
are on the upswing and fares are less and less linked to air miles covered.
In 1998, twenty-seven airports were seriously congested with over 20,000 hours
of delay per year, which is the equivalent of 833 days lost per year by each of the
twenty-seven airports due to aircraft delay. Moreover, nineteen out of the twenty
most congested airports worldwide can be found in the United States. FAIR 21
hopes to get over this problems by (1) realizing an ATC system that is technologi-
cally advanced, thanks to the three-fold increase in funds assigned to the Air
Traffic Control Facilities and Equipment Program (F & E) from 1 billion dollars
per year to 3 billion dollars per year; (2) increasing to 5 billion dollars per year
the fund for the Airport Improvement Program (AIP) in order to create new
flight infrastructure (runways, taxiways, etc.); (3) progressively eliminating, as
stated in the text, all the restrictions connected to the high density regulation;
(4) obliging the hub airports, where there are dominant carriers that intend to
apply for financial aid, to set down a plan showing how the airport intends to
encourage and open up to new competitors; (5) establishing a program of invest-
ment to help small and medium size communities to obtain and promote better
air services; (6) establishing a program of financial assistance to help small carri-
ers buy regional jet aircraft if they use them to connect small airports that are not
as yet serviced; and (7) increasing the fund to reduce noise pollution that affects
people living around the airport. Id. As far as the use of taxes paid is concerned,
in the preamble of the law it is observed that, since 1970 the passengers and the
operators contributed to the Airport and Aviation Trust Fund, with the supposi-
tion that any taxes paid would later be used to improve services. Id. at pmbl.
Unfortunately, this was not the case as only a small part of the money was in-
vested in building infrastructures. If the situation does not change, the balance
of the Airport and Aviation Trust Fund will increase by more than $90 billion. To
make sure that tax payers have a consistent return on taxes paid, the FAIR 21 rule
states that the money coming from airfare taxes, fuel and other taxes are in-
vested, as aforementioned, in order to achieve a safer and more efficient system
of civil aviation. Id.; see also Summary of FAIR 21, House Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure, Mar. 4, 1999.
62 49 U.S.C. § 41715(a) (2001).
63 See 49 U.S.C. § 41716(a) (2001) and 49 U.S.C. § 41717(b) (2001).
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FAIR 21 also allows the Department of Transportation to per-
mit Washington National airport to have twenty-four slot exemp-
tions, twelve of which are concerned with links to airports up to
1,250 miles away and twelve for airports that are further away: as
far as this airport is concerned, there is no provision for the
eventual elimination of the slot rule.
In the meantime, the Department of Transportation should
take the following into account when evaluating slot exemptions
so as to favour public interest:
The benefits to the American economy, also in terms of job
positions created and likewise consumer benefits following
exemption; 64
The availability of a more varied service that meets passenger
needs, are more economical, more efficient and less expensive;
Avoid unreasonable industrial concentrations, dominant posi-
tions in the market, monopolies and other such conditions that
make it easy for carriers to increase prices unreasonably and re-
duce services or cut out competition in air transport;
Encourage new air carriers or small carriers that are already
on the market scene to go from strength to strength and in-
crease in efficiency and at the same time ensure more competi-
tiveness in the air transport industry.65
The first results of this new rule have been positive: new carri-
ers have in fact been able to obtain access to La Guardia, Ken-
nedy, and O'Hare airports. For example, the carrier and new
entrant Midway Airlines has been able to obtain nine slots at La
Guardia, in place of the slots that it previously rented from an
incumbent carrier for $1.88 million a year.
3. Article 8.4 of the Regulation (CEE) No 95/93
In the preamble of this study, we noted that there is a strong
"hidden" slot market in Europe; that consists of trading, ex-
changes with monetary compensation, and purchases of compa-
nies, all with the unique aim of achieving slots.
The fact that these economic transactions take place in a "hid-
den" context is mainly due to the "cryptic" element of Article 8.4
of the 95/93 Regulation.66 In fact, it is not clear and does not
explicitly explain how slots should be given up, nor does it clar-
64 49 U.S.C. § 41715(c) (1).
65 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2001).
66 European Commission, Directorate General for Transport. Discussion Document,
Revision of Council Regulation 95/93, Apr. 10, 1996.
1588
EEC NO. 95/93
ify the relationship between the carrier that holds a slot and the
slot itself.
Article 8.4 states that" slots may be freely exchanged between
air carriers or transferred by an air carrier from one route, or
type of service, to another, by mutual agreement or as a result of
a total or partial takeover or unilaterally." Any such exchanges
or transfers shall be transparent and subject to confirmation of
feasibility by the co-ordinator that: a) airport operations would
not be prejudiced; b) limitations imposed by a Member State
according to Article 9 are respected; c) a change of use does not
fall within the scope of Article 11, which includes safety mea-
sures to ensure that the transfer of slots does not hinder free
competition or give advantage to certain carriers on particular
air routes that enables them to block any possible new entrants.
Other important factors that can be found in the Regulation
and that should be considered in this study are the following:
ARTICLE 8.5: Slot allocated to new entrants operating a service
between two community airports may not be exchanged or
transferred between air carriers or by an air carrier from one
route to another as provided for in paragraph four for a period
of two seasons.
ARTICLE 8(1) (A): An airline, which has used a slot in one traf-
fic season, is entitled to claim it in the next equivalent season.
ARTICLE 10(1) AND (7): Newly created slots, unused slots and
slots which have been given up by a carrier during, or by the end
of, the season or which otherwise become available are to be
placed in a slot pool and distributed among applicants, with new
entrants having priority over fifty percent of them.
ARTICLE 10(2): Any slots not utilized shall be withdrawn and
placed in the slot pool unless non-utilization is due to excep-
tional circumstances.
ARTICLE 10(3)-(5): "Grandfather rights" shall not apply un-
less the carrier can show that the slots have been used by that air
carrier for at least 80 percent of the time during the period for
which they have been allocated, except where it takes place due
to specified exceptional circumstances, and in such event the
slot shall be placed in the slot pool.
The slots can therefore be "freely exchanged among air
carriers."
The exchange can take place on the basis of "mutual agree-
ment" or following "total or partial takeover:" this second hy-
pothesis obviously takes into consideration those cases when a
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carrier purchases all or part of another carrier's shares and/or
all or part of its operations.6 v
The third hypothesis considers the case in which an exchange
takes place "unilaterally:" the use of this term is clearly inappro-
priate and as such should not be taken into consideration.
Anyway, it is not clear how mutual an exchange should be. In
other words, it is doubtful whether a carrier could exchange a
group of slots for one slot only, or whether the exchange should
follow the one for one rule.
67 John Balfour, Slots for Sale, 22 AIR & SPACE LAW 109, 111 (1997). The doc-
trine looked into the question of whether regulatory authorities (both national
and community authorities) are entitled to require the carriers to give up their
slots to other carriers in exchange for approval of an alliance or merger. In fact,
before Regulation 95/93 was introduced, it was common practice for the Euro-
pean Commission to impose such conditions (This can be seen in the case of
British Airways/British Caledonian, 1983; and again in the case of Air France/
UTA 1990; Air France/Sabena, 1992 and also British Airways / TAT, 1992.).
Once the Regulation 95/93 came into force the Commission was able to reaffirm
its position.
In July 1995, the Commission approved that Swiss Air could purchase 49.5 per-
cent of Sabena share capital, establishing certain basic undertakings for both par-
ties. These included, inter alia, the commitments of Sabena to make a maximum
eighteen slots per day to and from Brussels airport available to benefit any carrier
that wanted to start up or improve links on certain routes between Brussels and
Switzerland, and that had not been able to obtain slots needed via normal proce-
dures. In January 1996, the Commission granted exemption under former Arti-
cle 85.3 (now known as Article 81.3 following renumbering of the Treaty of
Amsterdam) in respect of the alliance between Lufthansa and SAS. The exemp-
tion was based on a series of conditions of which, one in particular, related to the
fact that the two carriers must make certain slots available, under certain condi-
tions, to the carrier that requests the slot, whenever a community carrier wants to
set up or improve links on eight specific routes between Germany and Scandina-
via, and cannot otherwise obtain these slots through normal procedures. The
doctrine shows some perplexity on whether these conditions can be imposed or
not. Article 10 of the Regulation 95/93 states clearly that slots not being used
(including those that have been given back) must be placed in the slot pool and
therefore it does not seem possible to place them elsewhere or give them up to a
third party established by an authority or by the Commission. Council Regula-
tion 95/93, 1993 O.J. (L 140) 1, at art. 10. If it is true, as stated in the 15th
whereas of Regulation 95/93, that a rule cannot fail to observe the fundamental
norms of a Treaty, including the ones that deal with competition, this does not
mean that the Commission can derogate a regulation granting exemption under
Article 81.3. Article 81.3 states that Article 83.1 can be declared not applicable in
certain cases, but it does not seem very plausible that such discretion can be
applied when it allows exemptions based on conditions that are incompatible
with other community rules. Id. art. 81.3. On the other hand, it would be more
acceptable should the Commission ask a carrier to exchange slots with another
carrier or with any new competitor that wants to run a service on a particular
route, on condition that the latter has or can obtain a sufficient number of slots
to complete the exchange.
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In contrast to the "exchange," is the so-called "transfer" that is
permitted only when a carrier wants to use one of his slots for a
different route or for a different type of service.
The transfer of a slot from one carrier to another is seemingly
not permitted by the Regulation: in fact, this would mean that a
slot is not being used by the carrier who is prepared to give it up
and so such a slot should be withdrawn and inserted into the
pool.68 Likewise, the Regulation does not allow for a slot to be
simply given up for a fee without any kind of slot exchange.69
Moreover, the prevalent point of view in the doctrine 70 is that
an exchange of slots together with an economic compensation is
acceptable.
An English court recently reached a decision on this point,
holding that "where slots are exchanged, the fact that there is an
accompanying money payment by the acquirer of what are per-
ceived to be the more valuable slots does not convert the ex-
change into a sale and does not take the transaction out of the
scope of an exchange. '"71
Moreover, the court did not pronounce sentence on an alter-
native argument advanced by the defendant (the slot Co-
ordinator at Heathrow airport) who claimed that even if he had
to admit that the transaction was a "transfer" and not simply an
exchange it was anyway permitted in the light of Article 8.4.
68 Balfour, supra note 67, at 110.
69 The former European Commissioner of Transport, N. Kinnock, observed
that "the Regulation did not provide for any kind of sale of the slots but only for
an exchange of them as can be seen in Art. 8(4)." O.J. No. L. 141.22.1.93.
70 Balfour, supra note 67, at 111; Girardi & Colletta, supra note 1, at 99; Silin-
gardi & Maffeo, supra note 1, at 35; Dario Maffeo, Sull'ammissibilita' di contratti di
compravendita di slots, in DIR. DE TRAsP. 668 (1999).
71 Regina v. Airport Co-ordination Limited ex parte of The State of Guernsey Transport
Board, Queen's Bench Division (Swansea Crown Court) March 25, 1999, DIR. DEI
TRAsp. 665 (1999). The fact that led to this statement came from certain deci-
sions taken by a slot coordinator at Heathrow (Airport Co-ordination Limited -
ACL) that approved an agreement reached between British Airways (BA) and Air
UK Limited (Air UK), a sub-company of KLM, dealing with some slot exchanges.
The peculiarity of this case was that although the same number of slots were
exchanged, their value was by no means equal. The slots transferred from BA to
Air UK where in fact those that Air UK did not intend to use and were in any case
about to be placed in the slot pool. On the other hand, the slots given to British
Airways by Air UK had a high commercial value. In fact, BA paid additional
money to Air UK along with the exchange. The Board of Guernesey that is re-
sponsible for all questions linked to transport to and from this place claimed that
this kind of transfer operation and sale was illegal, made to look like a legal ex-
change according to Article 8.4 of Reg. EEC January 18, 1993 No. 95/93. The
Board therefore summoned the slot coordinator at Heathrow.
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The judge, in view of his primary findings, concluded that he
did not need to reach decision on this point. The judge ex-
pressed relief that he did not have to do so because of the curi-
ous drafting of this part of Article 8.4. He added that he would
"content" [him] self with the observation that the "transfer" pro-
vision is something of a drafting curiosity, bearing the hallmark
of the old joke about the definition of a camel [i.e. a horse de-
signed by a committee].
It should, however, be noted that this interpretation of Article
8.4 (the only one possible according to us) authorizes the trad-
ing of slots. In fact, this trade constitutes a normal market pro-
cedure of exchanging slots with the ambiguous inclusion of
money dealings and the only restriction posed is that another
slot (even if it is valueless!) is part of the deal. 2
On the other hand, the term "grandfather rights," used in the
English language version of Regulation (EEC) No. 95/93, was
more than likely translated badly in the Italian text as "diritti
acquisiti" (i.e. rights acquired): the former simply means that
there is a historical precedence in using the slot, and it does not
give the carrier any exclusive right on the slot.73
The fact that it is impossible to talk about property rights of
carriers over slots is made even more clear considering the fact
that a slot, from a technical point of view, is only a space in time
that can be used by aircraft to take off and land. With this defi-
nition in mind, the German doctrine argues that time, in a cer-
tain place, is a something that belongs to the public, and goes
on to say that owners of slots only have equal rights in using
limited air space "gleichberechtigte Teilhabe am begrenzten
Gut Luftraum," and they cannot dispose any free choice over
this. 4
72 Maffeo, supra, note 70, at 671.
73 Bellan, supra note 1, at 75. In his presentation at the Strategy for Overcom-
ing Slots Limitation,John Balfour noted that questions related to ownership of a
slot are irrelevant because even if a party held a slot in the past it can not auto-
matically have it back or trade it in any way except when an airline company that
uses the slot is able to meet the 80 percent rule (a rule that is naturally very
seldom, if ever, achieved by carriers. See Balfour, supra note 8, at 4. However,
even if the 80 percent rule were met, the Regulation itself would be able to de-
cide the destiny of the unused part of the slot. Id.
74 See E. Giemulla & R. Schmid, Wem gehirt die Zeit?, Z.L.W. 51 (1992), and
Nochmals - Wem geh6rt die Zeit?, Z.L.W. 259 (1991). On the question regarding the
ownership of time, it would be interesting to note that during the Middle Ages,
renting with interest was condemned because it was not possible to sell time that




In the first draft of the reform of Regulation 95/93, there are
two main kinds of amendment of the original text. In fact, one
part aims at defining some of the measures mentioned in the
paper, without changing them radically. A second part includes
more revolutionary proposals that would completely change the
Regulation, if ever adopted.
As far as the first part is concerned, it includes a series of hy-
potheses that aim to modify the role of the co-ordinators in or-
der to make them more independent and make their position
more like that of a third party in the slot allocation procedure.
However, in this position, the co-ordinator would play a major
role, integrating and co-ordinating more with bodies such as
those that control air traffic and those managing the airport.v5
A further series of modifications in the reform aims at clarify-
ing those aspects of the Regulation that have produced varied,
conflicting interpretations in different Member States. For ex-
ample, the subdivision of community airport in two categories,
namely co-ordinated and fully co-ordinated, has been abolished:
if these proposals of modification were adopted, community air-
ports could be divided into two groups known as co-ordinated
airports (schedules facilitated airports where, in order to land or
take off, during the periods for which it is coordinated, it is nec-
essary for an air carrier to have been allocated a slot by a coordi-
de eadem mercatione ab ilio qui non possit statim solvere quam ab illo qui statim
solvit. Arguitur quod non, quia tunc venderet tempus et sic usuram committeret
vendens non suum." Le Goff, Tempo della Chiesa e Tempo del Mercante, TURIN 3
(1977).
75 See Draft proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation Amending
Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 of January 18, 1993, on Common Rules for the
Allocation of Slots at Community Airports, Brussels, May 25, 2000, at art. 1, § 4(b):
The Member State responsible for a schedules facilitated or coordinated airport
shall ensure the appointment of a qualified natural or legal person as schedules
facilitator or airport coordnator respectively after having consulted the air carri-
ers using the airport regularly, their representative organizations and the manag-
ing body of the airport. The same schedules facilitator or coordinator may be
appointed for more than one airport. Article 1, § 4(c):
A Member State shall ensure that at a schedules facilitated airport, the schedules
facilitator carries out his duties under the Regulation in an independent manner.
A Member State shall ensure that at a coordinated airport the coordinator is
institutionally separated and de facto independent from any single interested
party. The Member State shall ensure that the coordinator carries out his duties
impartially according to this Regulation and that sufficient resources are made
available in such a way that the financing of the coordination activities does not
affect his independence.
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nator) and schedule-assisted airports (airports where there is
potential for congestion at some period of the day or week that
is likely to be resolved by voluntary cooperation between airlines
and where a schedules facilitator has been appointed to facili-
tate the operations of air carriers operating or intending to op-
erate that airport).v Likewise, the definition of 'new entrant'
has been modified. On the one hand, it now includes carriers
with a more substantial presence at the airport in question, but
on the other hand, it explicitly excludes established carriers
benefiting from new entrant status through joint operations or
other arrangements. 77
Turning now to those amendments proposed that would radi-
cally change the Regulation 95/93, should they ever be ac-
cepted, the first to note introduces a clear explanation of the
carrier rights over a slot, following slot allocation. This draft of
reform clearly explains that slots are granted, rather than given,
76 See id. at art. 1, § 2(c) and (d).
77 See id. at art. 1, § 2(b) stating:
New entrant' shall mean (i) an air carrier requesting, as part of a
series of slots, a slot at an airport on any day, where, if the carrier's
request were accepted, it would in total hold fewer than five slots at
that airport on that day, or (ii) an air carrier requesting a slot for a
non-stop scheduled service between two Community airports where
at most two other air carriers operate a direct scheduled service
between these airports or airport systems on that day, where, if the
carrier's request were accepted, it would nonetheless hold fewer
that five slots at that airport on that day for that non-stop service;
(iii) an air carrier requesting a slot at an airport for a non-stop
scheduled service between that airport and a regional airport
where no other air carrier operates a direct scheduled service be-
tween these airports or airport systems on that day, where, if the
carrier's request were accepted, it would nonetheless hold fewer
that five slots at that airport on that day for that non-stop service.
For the purpose of paragraph (i), an air carrier shall not be consid-
ered as a new entrant if at the time of allocation: it has, at the air-
port concerned, a joint operation, code sharing or franchise
arrangement with another air carrier which itself is not considered
as a new entrant, or the majority of its capital is held by another air
carrier which itself is not considered as a new entrant (subsidiary
company), or it holds directly or indirectly the majority of the capi-
tal of another air carrier which itself is not considered as a new
entrant (parent company), or it forms part of a group of undertak-
ings, including air carriers of which one is not considered as a new
entrant. For the purpose of paragraph (ii), an air carrier which
alone or together with other partners in a group of airlines holding
more than 7 percent of the total number of slots on the day in
question at a particular airport, or airport system shall not be con-
sidered as a new entrant at that airport on that day.
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during slot allocation. As said in the Explanatory Memorandum
of the Draft Proposal:
The slot allocation system, should be considered as a 'conces-
sion' system where the slots are allocated to the most deserving
air carrier. In fact, the Commission has had this in mind when
deciding on the present proposals. Slots do not constitute prop-
erty rights but only entitle air carriers to access the airport facili-
ties by landing and taking off at specific dates and timings. All
slots are subject to that system, which foresees that slot allocation,
i.e. the allocation of the right to land and to take off at an air-
port, takes place on the basis of a time limitation."v
In fact, the paper proposes the temporary nature of the granted
rights and states that they should be destined to expire after a
period of ten equivalent scheduling periods from the date of
allocation. 79
If this principle were accepted, it would mean the total aboli-
tion of the "grandfather rights" and also of any pre-existing
rights held over slots by incumbent carriers. Established slot
rights would transform and therefore, automatically become
temporary in nature following the new Regulation. Such a re-
form would represent an excessive blow to carriers and with this
in mind, a mitigation of the proposed reform has been intro-
duced. The review suggests that those who already hold slots
and "grandfather rights" can go on doing so without time limits
until the slot is transferred or given up to another carrier or
placed into the slot pool. 0
78 Id. at Explanatory Memorandum, § 6.
79 See id. at art. 8, § 1 (a): "Slots are allocated on the basis of a concession at the
expiry of which they have to be returned to the slot pool as set up according to
the provisions of Article 10." See also Draft Proposal, supra note 75, at art. 10, § 1:
"All pool slots, except for those referred to in Article 8 (5), will be allocated to
applicant carriers for a period of ten equivalent scheduling periods. At the end of
ten equivalent scheduling periods, irrespective of any intervening transfers and/
or exchanges, the original allocated slot shall be placed back in the pool."
80 See id. at Explanatory Memorandum, § 7 stating:
The general framework for initial slot allocation in the draft Regu-
lation (Article 8(1)) reconfirms the principle of so-called 'grandfa-
ther rights.' This reconfirmation of a certain historic precedence
in the usage of slots is justified to the extent that the passengers will
benefit from a certain stability and continuity of services. This prin-
ciple is also of critical importance for the operators, which need the
guarantee that the networks they are developing will not be unduly
affected by forced and unpredictable reallocations of slots. For
these reasons, and because any change in the priority of the histori-
cal preference would have serious repercussions internationally, ex-
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Another point to be noted concerning "grandfather rights" is
that the draft of reform proposal establishes that only a group of
slots can be "grandfathered" and not single slots."'
The most interesting and innovative modification proposed in
the draft version of the Regulation deals with the mobility of
slots, that is the introduction of a system that allows slots to be
transferred from one carrier to another after slot allocation has
been granted that functions alongside the normal slot allocation
procedures.
In order to better understand the impact of the amendments
now under discussion, it is worth remembering certain cryptic
points set down in Article 8.4 of the Regulation that have caused
difficulty and led to varied and conflicting interpretations. Ac-
cording to the Regulation slots can be:
freely exchanged among air carriers;
transferred by a carrier from one route to another or from
one service to another;
exchanged, following total or partial purchase.
In fact, as already seen, in the original version of Article 8.4, it
is difficult to understand what "transfer" of a slot means exactly.
The proposed amendments attempt to clarify this term using it
to refer to all hypothesis of change of ownership of slot rights,
changes that do not represent any kind of exchange (i.e. sales,
leasing, donation, take over of slots following the partial or total
purchase of a carrier).
The amendments affect the original rule in two ways.
First, they confirm that the system of circulation of slots as
originally provided for in the Regulation is legitimate, but they
perts from the member States and from the industry have always
opposed any direct limitation of 'grandfather rights.
81 The principle of.'grandfather rights' is expressed in the Draft Proposal at
Article 8, § 1 (b) as follows:
Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article and subject to the pro-
visions of Articles 7, 8a, 9, 10 and 14, a slot that has been operated
by an air carrier as part of a series of slots cleared by the coordina-
tor shall entitle that air carrier to claim the same slot at the same
time as part of a series of slots in the next equivalent scheduling
period. Member States may limit such entitlement to series of slots
operated with a minimum aircraft size. Such entitlement shall not
give rise to any claims for compensation in respect of any limita-
tion, restriction or elimination thereof imposed under Community
law.
Id. at art. 8, § 1 (b).
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introduce a few corrections and specifications: 2 slot exchanges
continue to be permitted, but with the novelty that exchanges
can only be made on a one-to-one basis and that such an ex-
change is legitimate if both the carriers involved undertake to
use the slots exchanged.
Second, carriers can also continue to transfer their slots from
one route to another and from one type of service to another.
However, new entrants can only take advantage of this provi-
sion once they have held a slot for at least three equivalent sea-
sons, having obtained it through a co-ordinator. 83  Another
novelty is that slots can be transferred between parent and sub-
sidiary companies.
As for the acquisition of slots in case of (total or partial) take-
over, the amendments aim at clarifying that it constitutes a
transfer rather than an exchange, with the specification that
such a transfer is valid only when the slots transferred are di-
rectly related to the business taken over.
Looking at the amendments from a different point of view
that is more interesting for our study, it can be seen that the
amendments, presently under discussion, introduce into the
Regulation the right for carriers to transfer slots, even for a fee.
This enables carriers to sell, buy, and rent slots. In the Commis-
sion's opinion,
[t] he introduction of market mechanism as a way to facilitate slot
movements will contribute considerably to the flexibility at highly
congested airports. One of the main disadvantages of Regulation
95/93 has been that carriers have had no incentive to make effi-
cient use of their slot portfolio. Today, rather than returning
superfluous slots to the pool, carriers continue to use the slots in
order to ensure that they have sufficient slots when they need
them. This obviously leads to inefficiencies and reduces access
82 See id. at art. 8a, § 1 stating:
Slots may be: (a) transferred by an air carrier from one route or
type of service to another route or type of service operated by that
same air carrier; (b) transferred (i) between parent and subsidiary
companies, (ii) as part of the acquisition of the majority of the capi-
tal of an air carrier, or (iii) in the case of a total or partial take-over
when the slots are directly related to the business taken over; (c)
exchanged, one for one, between two air carriers where both air
carriers involved undertake to use the slots received in the
exchange.
83 See id. at art. 8a, § 5(b). Article 8a, § 5(b) states: "Slots allocated to a new
entrant as defined in Article 2 (b) (ii) and (iii) may not be transferred to another
route as provided for in paragraph 1 for a period of three equivalent scheduling
periods."
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for new entrants. By allowing air carriers to buy and sell, a mar-
ket of slots can develop that allows carriers to adapt their slot
portfolio to their real needs.8 4
It is more than likely that in the light of problems faced in the
U.S. following the Buy-Sell Rule, the modification of the Regula-
tion also considers the introduction of numerous limitations, re-
strictions and protective measures dealing with allocation of the
right to transfer slots. These can be summed up as follows:
Slots "can be transferred between air carriers... with or with-
out monetary compensation; "85
"no carrier shall be able, by effecting such transfers, to in-
crease its total number of slots per scheduling period at that
airport by more than 5 percent of the total number of slots avail-
able for allocation as determined in accordance with Article
6;"86
"Such transfers shall not take place during scheduling
conferences; "87
"At the end of ten equivalent scheduling periods, irrespective
of any intervening transfers and/or exchanges, the originally
transferred slot . . . shall be placed in the pool referred to in
Article 10;"88
Transfers must take place in a transparent and non-discrimi-
natory way. All carriers should be allowed to participate in the
transfer: "[a] ny interested air carrier shall be given the opportu-
nity to take note of such a transfer before it is implemented. To
this end, intended transfers shall be communicated to the coor-
dinator prior to their implementation, and the coordinator shall
keep a freely accessible register of intended slot transfers;" 89
"At the request of one or more air carriers interested in the
transfer ... the co-ordinator shall organise at the airport con-
cerned an auction meeting open to all interested carriers" to
ensure that they are allocated to the highest bidder. The auc-
tion "shall be conducted in a transparent, neutral and non-dis-
criminatory manner. The co-ordinator may limit the number of
auction meetings to no more than two by scheduling period;"9 °
84 See Draft Proposal, supra 75, at Explanatory Memorandum, § 11.
85 See id. at art. 8a, § 2(a).
86 See id.
87 See id.
88 See id. § 2(b).
89 See Draft Proposal, supra note 75, at art. 8a, § 2(c).
90 See id. § 3.
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"Slots allocated to a new entrant... may not be transferred to
another air carrier ... for a period of three equivalent schedul-
ing periods."'"
Both exchanges and transfers continue to be subject to the co-
ordinator's confirmation, who must, in addition to the require-
ments set down in Article 8.4, verify that:
Transfers do not concern slots that have been allocated to
new entrants and that have not yet been in vigour for three
equivalent scheduling periods since the first allocation date;
In the case of transfers, which take place accompanied by
monetary compensation, "no other carrier is willing to pay more
for the right to be transferred;"
9 2
"In the case of exchanges between two air carriers ... , both
carriers intend to operate the slots resulting from the exchange
or from the subsequent exchanges;" 93
It is interesting to note three more provisions in the draft pro-
posal of the Regulation, which, for different reasons, deserves
special attention.
According to the first of these provisions, leasing of slots shall
be considered and treated in the same way as transfers.94 To be
more specific, when slots are leased, it is necessary to apply the
same restrictions regarding the possibility for a carrier to in-
crease, following transfer, the number of slots held by more
than five percent of the total of slots available. Furthermore,
once a slot has been leased, the period of rental must be calcu-
lated in the ten-year period after which the slot must be placed
back into the slot pool. Lastly, the renting of the slots should be
made public, communicated to the co-ordinator, and included
by the co-ordinator into a public register.
This provision does not explicitly mention whether, in the
case of renting a slot, the request to use the slot for at least
eighty percent of the time in order to keep it, must be applied.
However, it appears that the similarity in treating renting and
transfers would mean that this rule does apply. The require-
ment can be met by simply demonstrating that slots are actually
used by the renting carrier, during the period of leasing.
91 See id. § 5(a).
92 See id. § 4(d).
93 See id. § 4(e).
94 See Draft Proposal, supra note 75, at art. 8a, § 2(a). Article 8a, § 2(a) states:
"Leasing of slots shall be considered as transfers within the meaning of this
paragraph."
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The second provision that deserves special attention and
should be quoted is the one that deals with the ownership of
slots when connections are provided by two joint carriers95 (for
example following code-sharing agreements, franchising or
other similar set-ups). In this case, a norm is introduced, in or-
der to ensure that:
Only one of the participating air carriers can apply for the
required slot;
Slots allocated to one air carrier in the operation may be used
by (an)other participating air carrier(s) for their shared opera-
tions, provided that the designator code of the air carrier to
whom the slots were allocated remains on the shared flight for
coordination and monitoring purposes;
Upon discontinuation of such operations, the slots so used
remain with the party to whom the slots were originally
allocated.
The third provision of particular interest is the one that deals
with the possibility of a co-ordinator to withdraw slots whenever
all measures set down in the Regulation have been exhausted,
and there are no other means of acquiring at least five percent
of slots allocated in order to grant them to new entrants.9 6 This
95 See id. at art. 8a, § 6 stating:
In the case ofjoint operations, code-sharing and franchise between
air carriers, only one of the participating air carriers can apply for
the required slots. The air carrier operating such a service assumes
responsibility for meeting the operating criteria required to main-
tain historical precedence. Slots allocated to one air carrier in the
operation may be used by (an) other participating air carrier(s) for
their shared operation, provided that the designator code of the air
carrier to whom the slots were allocated remains on the shared
flight for coordination and monitoring purposes. Upon discontin-
uation of such operations, the slots so used will remain with the air
carrier to whom they were initially allocated. Air carriers involved
in shared operations shall advise coordinators of the detail of such
operations.
96 See id. at art.10, § 8 stating:
If, less than 5 percent of the total number of slots available for allo-
cation at a given airport have been allocated to new entrants and if
outstanding requests exist from new entrants, the member State
shall ensure that a meeting of the airport coordination committee
is convened. The purpose of the meeting shall be to examine pos-
sibilities for improving the situation including reclaiming of slots
and ensuring that at least 5 percent of the total number of slots will
be allocated to new entrants for the next equivalent scheduling pe-
riod. The Commission shall be invited to such a meeting. The coor-
dinator shall implement measures proposed by the coordination
committee to remedy the situation, provided that such measures
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means that an incumbent community carrier could be asked to
give up some of its slots, in no uncertain terms, without discrimi-
nation and on a proportional basis, in order to ensure that five
percent of the total slots are available for distribution among
new entrants in the upcoming season. The justification for this
provision is given by the Commission in the Explanatory
Memorandum:
However, when the level of saturation at an airport is such that
new entry through the normal procedure is not possible, contin-
gency measures are required as a last resort solution. The Com-
mission considers it necessary to introduce the possibility of
withdrawal of slots when the other provisions of the Regulation
have failed to ensure that a minimum number of slots are allo-
cated to new entrants.97
5. Final considerations
After fifteen years since the high-density rule was first intro-
duced, it has failed. Through the Regulation, larger incumbent
carriers have been able to hoard a good part of the market and
make it difficult for new entrants to enter, thus forcing consum-
ers to pay high fares that do not correspond to the service
offered.
Furthermore, the Buy-Sell Rule has allowed the larger carriers
to sell public resources-that were given freely at the begin-
ning-for hundreds of millions of dollars without any economic
returns to the taxpayers.
The fact that these rules have allowed such carriers to avoid
having to give up their slots and has allowed them to lease slots
out to other companies or affiliate commuters, has led to a non-
optimal use of the precious resource of airport capacity.
respect Community law. If the coordination committee is unable
to remedy the situation otherwise, the coordinator shall, upon ap-
proval of the Member State responsible for that airport, reclaim
from Community air carriers series of slots on a transparent, non-
discriminatory and proportionate basis, to be evenly distributed
over the coordinated period(s) as defined in paragraph 5 (a) of
this Article, so that for the scheduling period in question 5 percent
of the total number of slots will be available for redistribution. The
coordinator shall allocate these reclaimed slots to new entrants as
defined in Article 2 (b). The coordinator shall make available upon
request all relevant documents, notably those concerning the meth-
odology used for the reclaim and the redistribution of the slots, to
interested parties.
97 See id. at Explanatoiy Memorandum, § 8.
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The United States Government faced this problem by opting
to abolish-albeit progressively-both the high-density rules
and the norms dealing with the trading of slots.
Meanwhile in Europe, despite the provisions set down in Arti-
cle 8.4 that does not allow for the trading of slots, a "hidden
market" was established bringing with it negative side effects for
competition.
However, as already noted, slots are rare goods and carriers
are prepared to pay high sums of money for them. In addition,
a flight link with good slots is guaranteed to provide high
chances of success and could represent a strong barrier, keeping
out competition.
In such a situation, it is wrong not to regulate the issue, trust-
ing in a free market. On the other hand, it is wrong to impose
absolute prohibitions that would inevitably create elusion diffi-
cult to control.
In both cases, slots would continue to be traded but without
any guarantees of transparency and without taking into consid-
eration the interests of the consumer-user.
For these reasons it must be agreed that the measures pro-
posed by the modification of Article 8.4 of Regulation 95/93,
recognizing the possibility of trading slots, are easily acceptable.
It could be argued that the measures taken in the United
States led to unwanted effects of strengthening the position of
certain undeserving carriers that already controlled the market
and hindered new potential competitors. On the other hand,
many of the provisions set down to amend to slot transfer rules
make it clear that certain risks can be avoided.
Without a doubt, the intention to define carrier rights when
slots are allocated in a non-ambiguous way can only be appreci-
ated. The introduction of the concept to grant slots is appropri-
ate. In this way, the idea that a slot was in any way an object to
be owned, even in a restricted and conditioned way, has been
pushed aside. With this subject in mind, we have already noted
that goods of certain category, like time, cannot belong to any
single body, but by definition must belong to the general public
and denied to individuals.
It is more difficult to accept other aspects set down in the re-
form. The careful position taken in dealing with "grandfather
rights" can only dissatisfy. As aforementioned, the adoption of
the proposed amendments to the regulation, regarding a slot as
something that is granted rather than owned, would mean the
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eventual abolition of "grandfather rights." If this does not hap-
pen, and "grandfather rights" continue to exist, it cannot be de-
nied that these represent an obstacle in reaching the main
objectives of the reform. The rights to have priority in slot allo-
cation, favouring ad aeternum those whom already hold slots
certainly does not reconcile with the need to guarantee compe-
tition among carriers, even if it is efficient and plausible. The
statement that, due to the abolition of the "grandfather rights,"
incumbent carriers would be harmed since they had already in-
vested a lot on the connections they already operate, seems to
be a pretext, and fails to sustain those who want to keep the
"grandfather rights." It is difficult to understand why a new en-
trant has to be able to cover the costs of investment made within
a ten-year period and yet an incumbent carrier (who has proba-
bly already been using the slot for a long time) considers the
same period to be a kind of penalty. Even if this is the case, a
transitory period allowed in the reform should be sufficient to
moderate any eventual negative effects, as the withdrawal of
slots at each slot expiry date would be gradual.
The rule regarding the renting of slots seems to be too
concise.
It would be opportune to use transfer rules as a point of refer-
ence and thus making the rules on renting slots more explicit in
order to avoid conflicting interpretations. Other aspects of the
rule need to be rewritten. To be more specific, we are referring
to the need to sanction the eighty percent period necessary to
keep hold of a slot even in the case of renting. The aim of this
norm restriction is to avoid any eventual risk that the renting of
a slot could become an easy system for temporary storing of un-
used slots and a way of stopping their withdrawal, as occurred in
the United States.
Finally, we want to highlight a point that needs considerable
attention in order to improve the Regulation 95/93, which
seems to have remained unaltered even after the amendments.
We are referring to the scarce, if nonexistent, part played by
airport managing bodies in slot allocation procedures.
This non-existence is particularly strange if you consider that
a slot is a carrier's right to use the infrastructure and services of
an airport for a certain period of time whenever it lands or takes
off. 98
98 For explanation of the slot concept, see Silingardi & Maffeo, supra note 1, at
12.
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A slot is therefore linked to the capacity of airport infrastruc-
tures and the company that runs the airport has the task of con-
tinuously increasing it, at its own expense. 99
The airport managing body that builds, maintains, and ex-
tends its infrastructures is strongly linked to the slot and there-
fore, should be able to participate and have a more important
role in slot allocation and slot transfer procedures.
We particularly believe in a system and procedure that allow
airport managing bodies to express their point of view and even
oppose certain transfers and allocation of slots that harm or hin-
der the development of air links that are considered to be vital
for both consumers and for the community served by the
airport. 00
99 Refer to the text of art. 3 of Reg. (EEC) No. 95/93.
100 For the safeguard of the interests of the Local Communities in the United
States of America, see observations, supra notes 24 & 25.
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